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ABSTRACT

The addition of "active inducement" to the Copyright Act would compliment the
doctrine of contributory liability by punishing those who actively encourage copyright
infringement. Actively inducing infringement can include advertising an infringing
use or other affirmative acts.
Therefore, active inducement provides a
technology-neutral standard that would not look to punish bad technology but rather
bad actions by the technology distributor. In contrast, the reasonable person
standard of the Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004 ("Induce Act")
permits an inappropriate extension of the exclusive rights given to copyright holders
by lowering the threshold for litigation. Consequently, the Induce Act improperly
places policy questions on the merits of technology in the hands of the judiciary
which becomes antithetical to intellectual property laws by chilling innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
The VCR became a staple in American homes and launched a multi-billion
dollar video rental and sales industry.1 Personal video recorders have begun to take
the VCR's place, becoming so well liked that the phrase "TiVo it" is beginning to
replace "record it."2 Even trendier is the iPod ® , which has allowed millions of people
to unchain their music library from the home computer. 3 These technologies have
seamlessly integrated into everyday life, but most people are ignorant of proposed
legislation that will chill the innovation that generated these technologies: the
Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004 ("Induce Act").4 The Induce Act will
allow copyright holders to control any technology that is simply capable of facilitating
infringement.
Demonstrating the scope of the Induce Act, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
drafted a hypothetical claim for the music recording industry against Apple
Computer. 5 Essentially, the major copyright holders would seek to hold Apple liable
*J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. Chemical
Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois.
' See Clayton Collins, Why Blockbuster Clings to its DVDs and Rentals, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 24, 2005, at 12 (stating that in 2003, video rental sales were $8.2 billion and that
VIS and DVD purchasers spent $14 billion combined).
2 Rachel Singer Gordon, TiVo For Dummies, LIB. J. REVS, Oct. 1, 2004, 104 (comparing the
phrase "TiVo it"to "Google it").
3 Rob Pegararo, Apple Makes Tiny Steps For the Masses, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, El
(stating that "Apple has sold more than 10 million iPods to date and 230 million songs online at its
iTunes Music Store.").
4Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
Senator Orin Hatch introduced Senate Bill 2560, commonly known as the Induce Act, on June 22,
2004. The Induce Act would add a cause of action for inducing infringement to Section 501 of the
Copyright Act:
(g)(1) In this subsection, the term "intentionally induces" means
intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts
from which a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement based
upon all relevant information about such acts then reasonably available to the
actor, including whether the activity relies on infringement for its commercial
viability.
(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in subsection (a)
shall be liable as an infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines of
vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement or require any
court to unjustly withhold or impose any secondary liability for copyright
infringement.
Id.
5 Letter from Cindy A. Cohn, Esq., Legal Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation, to the
General Public (June 24, 2004), availahble at http://www.eff.org/IP/Apple-Complaint.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Apple Complaint].
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as an inducer for selling the iPod®. 6 For example, Apple is aware, as is most of the
world, that millions of computer users are engaging in the unauthorized download of
MP3 files using peer-to-peer ("P2P") file swapping programs.7 Further, Apple chose
8
to design the iPod® with a 10,000-song capacity and the widely used MP3 format.
Under these circumstances, Apple is arguably subject to liability under the Induce
Act, even though the iPod® has noninfringing uses and Apple has no control over
those who use the iPod®.9
This hypothetical claim shows how the Induce Act gives courts the power to
punish Apple for producing "bad technology." 10 From a policy standpoint, the Induce
Act inappropriately extends secondary liability and puts questions fit for Congress in
the hands of the judiciary.1 1 Furthermore, the Induce Act does not define the
technology that Congress wishes to eliminate. 12 Instead, the Induce Act allows the
judiciary to determine the liability of a technology distributor based on the actions of
13
its users.
Any legal discussion about finding a balance between new technology and
14
copyright holders must begin with Sony v. Universal.
In 1984, the Supreme Court
found Sony not liable for its VCR sales because VCRs have a "substantial
noninfringing use."1 5 Under this objective test, technology companies are allowed to
innovate without the fear of being hauled into court for a device that consumers
might use to infringe someone's copyright. 16 In its place, the Induce Act threatens to
subject innovators to liability whenever their technology is capable of facilitating
infringement.
Unquestionably, the recording industry's recent courtroom loss against P2P
distributors motivated the proposal of the Induce Act. 17 In MGM v. Grokster, a
California federal district court found two distributors of P2P software not subject to
secondary liability for the infringement of its users, a decision seemingly contrary to
6 See id.

7 Id. at 4. Apple also arguably encouraged piracy through its "Rip, Mix, and Burn" campaign.
Id. at 5. The MP3 is a digital file standard set by the Moving Picture Experts Group in 1987. A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). By "ripping" the analog format of
a song off a compact disc (CD"), and compressing the song into a digital format, the MP3 version of
the song will be smaller in size than the original audio file on the CD. Soo id.
8
Apple Complaint, supra note 5, at 5. Arguably the size of the iPod + hard drive is
unnecessarily large and would encourage the purchaser to download music in order to fill it up. Id.
9 See id. 3-9.
10See id.
A "bad technology" simply facilitates infringement, regardless of whether its
distributor actively encourages infringement, allowing a court to determine when a technology
causes more harm than good.
11See Michael Grebb, Hollywood Files P2P Appeal, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 8, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65290,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). The Induce
Act will overturn the legal precedent that "lead to the largest and most profitable period of
technological innovation in this country's history." Id.
8.
12See Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
13 See, e.g., Apple Complaint, supranote 5, 1-9.
1' Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
15 Id. at 442.
16 See Grebb, supra note 11, para. 8 (quoting GiGi B. Sohn, president of Public Knowledge, a
public-interest advocacy group).
17 150 CONG. REC. S7189-92 (2004) (statement of Senator Orin Hatch). Senator Hatch is
introducing the Induce Act to fight P2P software because "[s]ome P2P software appears to be the
definition of criminal inducement captured in computer code." Id. at S7189.
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the Ninth Circuit's decision in the famous Napstertrial.18 Since the proposal of the
Induce Act, however, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed Grokster.'9 This decision
encouraged the recording and motion picture industries to petition the Supreme
20
Court for certiorari and lobby Congress in support of the Induce Act.
This behavior should not come as a surprise. 21 The recording and motion picture
industries have been trying to use the legal system to preserve their share of media
distribution rights with the introduction of every new copying and distribution
technology. 22 For example, the introduction of FM radio, the VCR and cable
television each led to a battle from the established content distributors to chill the
adoption of these technologies. 23 Consistently, Congress and the courts have chosen
to protect innovation at the expense of copyright holders, allowing the market to set a
new equilibrium on its own.24 The internet, however, has changed the mood of the
25
courts and Congress.

ISMGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The
district court dismissed the case against the P2P software distributors Grokster and Streamcast on
a summary judgment motion. Id. The Napster decision can be found in A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-29 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court shut down the popular
file-swapping service of Napster because it was subject to contributory and vicarious liability for the
unauthorized downloading of copyrighted music that the Napster program facilitated. Id.
19MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Circ. 2004), cert. granted,125
S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004).
20See Neil Portnow, Taking Stock: A Matter Of Respect, BILLBOARD, Sep. 11, 2004, (Neil
Portnow is the President of the National Academy of Recording Arts & Sciences).
21See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158. There is a rich history of litigation accompanying the
introduction of new technologies that affect media distribution:
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of reproducing sound has
struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners, often resulting in federal
litigation. This appeal is the latest reprise of that recurring conflict, and one of a
continuing series of lawsuits between the recording industry and distributors of
file-sharing computer software.
fld.
22See id.
23 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2003). The owners and operators of AM radio
stations tried to stop the introduction of FM technology. Id. at 3-7. Disney and Universal tried to
stop Sony from selling the Betamax videocassette recorder because users could tape their television
programming. Id. at 75-77. The major over-the-air broadcast networks tried to stop cable television
from re-transmitting their programming. Id. at 59-61.
24 See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167. The court explained the policy rationale behind allowing the
free market to come to equilibrium, stating:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet history has shown that time and
market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new
technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a
personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player.
Id.
25 LESSIG, supra note 23, at 194. Lessig states "the pattern of deference to new technologies
has now changed with the rise of the Internet." Id. The courts chose to "[smother] the new to benefit
the old," instead of finding a balance between the new technology and established distribution
systems. Id.
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The introduction of broadband internet brought with it the well-known problem
of unauthorized file sharing. 26 Furthermore, there are prohibitive transactional costs
associated with bringing an infringement suit against even a substantial number of
the estimated 60 million Americans downloading copyrighted music. 27 For example,
even if the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") were to sue 10,000
file sharers a month, all things being equal, it would take 500 years to sue 60 million
infringers. 28
Consequently, copyright holders decided that their only effective
recourse was attempting to hold P2P distributors subject to contributory and
vicarious liability. When this course of action failed, the Induce Act was proposed.
The goal of this comment is to explore how the Induce Act improperly places
policy questions on the merits of technology in the hands of the judiciary and this
becomes antithetical to intellectual property laws by chilling innovation. The journey
to this conclusion begins with Part I, the background section. Part I is divided into
three sub-parts. Part A discusses the general facets of copyright law. Part B
discusses the landmark case, Sony v. Universa, which established the "substantial
noninfringing use" defense to contributory liability. 29
Part C outlines the
development of secondary liability in P2P litigation. Next, Part II introduces
Congress' current solution to the confusion created by the background cases. Part III
analyzes the Induce Act in light of its goal to stop unauthorized file sharing.
Ultimately, Part IV proposes that the Induce Act should not leave Congress and
explores alternatives to its passage.

I.BACKGROUND
This section presents the major case law concerning secondary liability in
copyright law. Particularly, Part C discusses the relevant case law concerning P2P
file-sharing technology.

A. General CopyrightLaw
Congress has the authority to enact copyright laws pursuant to its
Constitutional power to promote the progress of science and useful arts. 30 In order to
foster innovation, Congress extended several exclusive rights to copyright holders,

26 See Grebb, supra note 11, para. 10 (according to the entertainment industries' petition for
certiorari in Grokster,P2P networks are responsible for the unauthorized downloading of over 2.6
billion music files and at least 400,000 movies every month).
27 LESSIG, supra note 23, at 67 (citing a 2002 study estimating that roughly 60 million
Americans have downloaded music via the internet).

28 RIAA, About Us, available at http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited Apr. 6,
2005) (explaining that the "RIAA is a trade group that represents the U.S. recording industry").
2$)Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
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including the right to control distribution. 31 Additionally, copyright infringement can
2
involve the trespass on any one of these exclusive rights.
The introduction of a new copying technology traditionally brings cries of
infringement and piracy from established media distributors.3 3 In fact, the invention
34
of the printing press was the impulse behind the creation of the first copyright laws.
These laws were enacted to establish a balance between an author's right to protect
their works and the public interest in the free flow of information.3 5 In contemporary
times, new technologies are still affecting this balance.

B. The Sony Test
In Sony v. Universal, the Supreme Court attempted to establish a balance
between the interests of copyright holders and the public after the introduction of the
VCR.36 Sony produced one of the first VCRs, the Betamax. 37 One function of the
Betamax technology allowed users to record copyrighted television programs. 38 The
Betamax users were committing copyright infringement without any encouragement
or control from Sony.3 9 Therefore, the Court evaluated whether Sony was liable for
40
supplying a product capable of facilitating copyright infringement.
Although Sony had no control over the use of the Betamax after the point of sale,
Disney and Universal argued that Sony was liable as a secondary infringer. 41 A
literal reading of the Copyright Act, however, did not expressly provide for secondary
31 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). The Copyright Act grants the copyright holder "exclusive rights to do
and to authorize" the following: reproduction, derivation, distribution, performance and display. Id.
32 See id. § 501(a).
33 LESSIG, supra note 23, at 61 (stating "[i]f piracy means using value from someone else's
creative property without permission from that creator ...then every industry affected by copyright
today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy."). Piracy is commonly defined as "a
use that robs an author of his profit." Id. at 66.
'31See Tyler T. Ochoa, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 914 (2002) (stating that a "near-monopoly on printing and
publishing" led to the first copyright statute).
'3 See id. at 914-19.
36 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The Supreme
Court explained the policy considerations in evaluating this case by stating:
Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information,
and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been
amended repeatedly.
Id. The respondents, Walt Disney Productions and Universal City Studios, are the owners of many
copyrighted motion pictures broadcast across television networks. Id. at 420-22. The respondents
alleged that Betamax users were illegally recording their copyrighted programs. Id.
37Id.at 422-23.
'3 Id. (the court determined that "time shifting," recording a program to watch it at later time,
was fair use, but "library building," recording a program in order to watch it multiple times, was
copyright infringement). See id. at 447-55.
39 Id. at 439 n.19.

40Id. at 420 (stating that the primary inquiry will be "whether the sale of the [Betamax] to the
general public violates any of the rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act").
41 Id. at 438.
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liability. 42 The Court opined it would be unjust to hold Sony liable as vicarious
infringers where Sony had only constructive knowledge of the fact Betamax users
may use the Betamax to infringe. 43 Furthermore, the Court found no precedent in
common law to hold Sony liable under the copyright laws when Sony had no way to
44
control how Betamax owners used its product.
For guidance, the Supreme Court looked to the Patent Act. 45 In contrast to the
law governing copyright, the Patent Act expressly dealt with inducement and
contributory infringement. 46 First, the Court reasoned that the patent laws were
analogous to the copyright laws because they share a similar "kinship."47 Second, the
Court declared that there are fundamental aspects of tort law which hold persons
48
responsible for the actions of others.
However, the contributory liability element of the Patent Act contains a
limitation. 49
The distributor of an article of commerce with a "substantial
noninfringing use" will not be liable as a contributory infringer. 50 In addition, a
finding of contributory infringement under patent law would not remove the article
from commerce, but instead would act to extend the patent holder's monopoly to
include the infringing article. 51 For example, a finding of contributory liability would
force Sony to pay a royalty to the copyright holders for simply placing the Betamax in
the stream of commerce. 52 The Supreme Court believed that extending a copyright
holder's rights to include the Betamax would be inappropriate.53 Ultimately, the
Court held:
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). The Copyright Act only codifies direct infringement. Id.

43 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-39 (stating there is no precedent in copyright law to find someone
subject to contributory liability for the knowledge of possible infringement).
44 Id. (holding that subjecting Sony to vicarious liability for the sale of the Betamax with the
constructive knowledge buyers would make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material would be
inequitable).
45 Id. at 434-35.
46 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2000).
47 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
48 See id. at 435 (stating "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law" and
contributory infringement is an equitable doctrine).
41)
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for subhstantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id. (emphasis added).
5o Td.; see Sony 464 U.S. at 440.
51 Sony, 464 U.S. at 441. In patent infringement cases, subjecting a defendant to contributory
liability is the "functional equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly
granted by the patentee." Td. Therefore, products infringe when there is no other substantial use
for the product other than the infringing use. See id.
52 See id.
5' 1d. at 441 n.21. In effect, Disney and Universal told the court they were "willing to license
their claimed monopoly interest in [VCRs] to Sony in return for a royalty." Id. The Supreme Court,
however, stated that from a policy interest it would be "extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright
Act confers upon copyright owners collectively . . . the exclusive right to distribute [VCRs] simply
because they may be used to infringe copyrights." Id.
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The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective . . . protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
54
noninfringing uses.

C P2PLitigation
The introduction of P2P technology challenged the applicability of the objective
"substantial noninfringing use" test and the balance of interests. Three major cases
in P2P litigation confronted the Sony test. Part 1 of this section presents Napster,
the first case to find the distributors of a file-sharing program subject to secondary
liability. Part 2 discusses Grokster, declaring the sale and distribution of P2P legal.
Part 3 discusses Aimster, suggesting that "willful blindness," the conscious design of
P2P software to avoid secondary liability, can subject a P2P distributor to liability.

1. Napster-Liahilityfor Control
Fast-forwarding almost twenty years from Sony, the Ninth Circuit considered
the question of holding a distributor of file-sharing software subject to secondary
liability in Napster.55 Napster was the first widely adopted online file-sharing
56
clearinghouse, amassing 80 million registered users in the first eighteen months.
Napster gained this widespread adoption and popularity because it made possible the
57
unauthorized downloading of copyrighted music in MP3 format.
Similar to the Sony Betamax, however, the Napster software is a copying
technology that cannot infringe by itself.58 Therefore, the recording industry claimed
secondary liability, arguing that Napster should be subject to liability under
copyright law because it encouraged and enabled internet file sharing of copyrighted
works. 59 Napster attempted to escape liability by asserting the Sony test, but the
court found the facts to be distinguishable. 60 Unlike Sony, Napster had specific

54 Id.
at 442. Hereinafter, this objective test that places limitation on contributory liability will
be referred to as the Sonytest. See id.
55 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
,16LESSIG, supra note 23, at 67 (discussing the rapid growth of Napster file-swapping program
and the number of Americans believed to be illegally file sharing).
57 See id.; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-13.
58 See Napster,239 F.3d at 1011-13. The users supply the music and chose what to download.

Id.
59 Id. at 1019-24 (discussing the two prongs of secondary liability: contributory and vicarious
liability).
6o Id. at 1020 (rejecting the substantial noninfringing use test because Napster knew of the
infringement of its users).
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knowledge of the infringing acts. 61 For example, the RIAA notified Napster of 12,000
infringing files being swapped via the file-sharing software, and Napster executives
had actually used the system to download copyrighted works. 62 The court concluded
that the Sony test would not apply where a defendant has specific knowledge of
63
infringement.
The court began by defining a contributory infringer as "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another." 64 Here, the court determined that the services
provided by Napster equated to providing the "site and facilities for direct
infringement." 65 For example, Napster "supplies the proprietary software, search
66
engine, servers, and means of establishing a connection between users' computers."
Therefore, Napster was subject to contributory liability for their specific knowledge of
67
infringement and material contribution.
The court then looked at whether Napster engaged in vicarious copyright
infringement. 68 The Ninth Circuit stated, "vicarious liability extends ... to cases in
which a defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and

61 Id. at 1020 n.5. Napster had both actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement.
Id. According to the Court, "Napster had constructive knowledge where (a) Napster executives have
recording industry experience; (b) they have enforced intellectual property rights in other instances;
(c) Napster executives have downloaded copy-righted songs from the system; and (d) they have
promoted the 'site screen shots listing infringing files." Id.

(32Id.

(3 Id. at 1020. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Napste±rfrom Sony, where liability could only
be imposed on Sony for its constructive knowledge that Betamax purchasers may use the technology
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. Id.
(4 Id. at 1019 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). The court in Gershwin supported this contributory liability rule using the
reasoning of two cases. First, the Gershwincourt stated, "mere quantitative contribution cannot be
the proper test to determine copyright liability."
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 n.8 (quoting
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968)). Second, the court
agreed with the result of Screen Gems, finding an advertising agency which placed noninfringing
advertisements for the sale of infringing cassette tapes liable as a contributory infringer where it

was shown to have had knowledge, or reason to know, of the infringing nature of the records.
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (discussing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
65 Napster,239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding the operator of a flea market liable for infringing cassette tape sales taking place on
its grounds). However, in Fonovisa the court held that Cherry Auction "actively strives to provide
the environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive. Its participation in the
sales cannot be termed passive." Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. Thus, the court's statement that
"providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory
liability" is discussed as dicta. Id.
(A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919-20 (N.D. Ca. 2000). This
factual determination was accepted by the Ninth Circuit in Napster. Napster,239 F.3d at 1022.
67 Id. By using their specific knowledge of the infringing material and the support services
that contributed to the infringement, the court held that Napster could have blocked access to
suppliers of infringing material. Id.
(3 Id. at 1022-24 (holding that "in the context of copyright law ... vicarious liability extends
beyond an employer/employee relationship"). The court also construed that the Sony test does not
apply to vicarious liability because that question was not before the Supreme Court. Id. at 1022;
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984).
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also has a direct financial interest in such activities." 69 Here, Napster generated
revenue by increasing their user base and possessed a level of supervision and
control over the users of the software by directly controlling the Napster servers and
software. 70 For example, Napster had the "ability to locate infringing material ...
71
and terminate users' access to the system."
Ultimately, the control and knowledge possessed by Napster distinguished this
case from Sony. However, with the legal "flaws" of Napster in mind, developers
designed a new flavor of P2P to avoid secondary liability, similar to a corporation
attempting to avoid tax law.7 2 As a result, the Ninth Circuit's decision in MGM v.
73
Grokstershocked the recording industry.

2. Grokster-No Liability without Control
In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit found Grokster and StreamCast not subject to
secondary liability for the distribution of P2P file-sharing software.7 4 The defendants
distributed a decentralized P2P file-sharing system, similar to that of Napster in
function, but significantly dissimilar in design.7 5 Employing a decentralized design,
the individual computer users operating the software form a "spider web" network
that does not require a central server.7 6 Specifically, the defendants' programmed a
file-sharing technology that removed the functional ability to know or control what
files were being swapped.77 As a result, the court's summary judgment in favor of the
78
defendants turned directly on the facts.
69 Napster,239 F.3d at 1022.
70 Id. at 1022-24. Napster's revenue is directly dependent upon the number of users of the
software and the amount of music available. Id. at 1023. The court then compared the abilities of
the Napster software to the Fonovisa flea market meet case. Id. (discussing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at
262-63).
Napster officials knew of the infringement and had the ability to choose not to
authenticate users who were known to infringe or go as far as removing the infringing files from its
search database. Id. at 1024. Similarly, in Fonovisa the swap meet operators knew that infringing
cassette tapes were being sold and could have stopped the sellers from participating in the swap
meet. fd. at 1023. Ultimately, the failure to "police the premises" subjected both Napster and
Cherry Auction to vicarious liability. Id. at 1024.
71 Id.
72 Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003) (stating that a programmer
"targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes, and has no means to rewrite laws in general").
Ultimately, P2P programmers have lowered the costs of the copyright system. Id at 683. The new
flavors of P2P technology include: KaZaA, Grokster, Morpheus, and Bearshare. Idat 733.
73 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,125 S.
Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004).
74 See id. at 1167.
75 Id. at 1158-60; see Wu, supra note 72, at 737-39.
76 Grokster, 380 F.3d 1158-60; see Wu, supranote 72, at 737-39.
77 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160-64. The capabilities of the defendant's software should not come
as a surprise in light of dicta by the Ninth Circuit in Napster:
Conversely, absent any specific information that identifies infringing activity, a
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely
because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material. To enjoin simply because a computer network allows for infringing use
would, in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity unrelated to
infringing use.
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The court began its analysis of contributory infringement by looking at the P2P
distributors' knowledge and material contribution to the infringement.' 9 The Ninth
Circuit's construction of the Sony test required the plaintiff to show the defendant
had "reasonable knowledge of specific infringement," where a technology has a
substantial noninfringing use, in order to meet the knowledge requirement of
contribution.8 0 The music industry could not contradict evidence of the P2P's
substantial noninfringing uses.81 In addition, the design of the decentralized P2P
was important. The file-sharing software distributed by Grokster and StreamCast
82
could be distinguished from Napster.
Neither technology provided for the creation
or control of a central index of the swapped files. 8 3 Therefore, the "plaintiffs notices
of infringing conduct are irrelevant because they arrive when Defendants do nothing
' 4
to facilitate, and cannot do anything to stop, the alleged infringement."
85
Consequently, the P2P distributors escaped the knowledge requirement.
The material contribution element turned on similar facts. In contrast to
Napster, the defendants did not provide the "site and facilities." 8 6 Again, Grokster
and StreamCast did not create or control indices to the infringing files and could not
remove an offending user's account.8 7 Rather, "it is the users of the software who, by
connecting to each other over the internet, create the network and provide the
access." 8 8 In light of the public benefit of P2P and the fact that contributory
infringement does not require a showing of financial gain, the court refused to extend
contributory liability to the decentralized P2P.89
The court then determined that the P2P distributors did not engage in vicarious
infringement. 90 Grokster and StreamCast did not have the "right and ability to
supervise the infringers."91 Here, the design of the decentralized P2P network

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
7STim Wu, Grokster Wins, Lessig Blog, Aug. 9, 2004, at http://www.Lessig.org/blog/archives/
wu.shtml (last viewed Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Wu Blog] (stating that "[t]he Ninth Circuit has
decided that, on the facts developed, Grokster-style P2P technology is an easy case under Sony').
9 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160 (stating the elements of contributory infringement are: "(1) direct
infringement by a primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material
contribution to the infringement").
80 Id. at 1161.
In contrast, the distributor of a technology with no capability of a substantial
noninfringing use need only be held to have a constructive knowledge of infringement in order to
meet the knowledge requirement. Id.
SI Id. at 1162.
The court discusses the example of the band Wilco receiving widespread
popularity through P2P and obtaining a subsequent record deal, where previously the record
company did not see market viability for the band. d. at 1161; see Lawrence Lessig, Why Wileo is

the Future ofMusic, WIRED, Feb. 2005, at 69.
82

Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.

83 Jd
81 Id.at 1162. Even after pulling the plug on each one of the P2P distributors' computers, the
users of their P2P file-swapping programs could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.
d. at 1163.

85 Id.

8 Id.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 Id.
90

at 1164.

d at 1164-66.

91 Id.at 1165.
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directly influenced the distributors' ability to police the network. 92 In short, the
defendants escaped liability under both contributory and vicarious liability by
removing knowledge and control from a technology similar in function to Napster.
Additionally, the Grokster court maintained public policy by allowing some
93
infringement in order to protect innovation.

3. Aimster-Liabilityfor Willful Blindness
Judge Posner decided the Aimster case between the time the Ninth Circuit
analyzed Napster and Grokster.94 The decision is similar to that of Napster,finding
a P2P technology distributor subject to contributory liability. 95

Noting that both

sides were construing Sony in their favor, the court attempted to find a middle
ground. 96 Judge Posner added to the Sony test the caveat that a capability of
noninfringing use was not enough to evade liability where there was no proof of an
actual ongoing noninfringing use. 97 Here, Aimster could not prove any ongoing
noninfringing uses of the Aimster system. 98 Additionally, Aimster's central server
directly encouraged infringement by conveniently listing the top 40 downloaded
songs, which were invariably copyrighted. 99 Judge Posner shifted the burden to the
P2P distributor to show actual, ongoing noninfringing uses, and not just a capability
of noninfringing use. 100
Although dicta, Aim ster is important for the idea of "willful blindness." 10 1 Judge
Posner opined that a person who knows infringement is likely to take place, but
specifically designs a P2P program to avoid the knowledge requirement, should be
subject to secondary liability. 10 2 The recording industry asked the Ninth Circuit to
10 3
adopt this standard in Grokster,but the court disagreed.
92 Id.

at 1166.
Id. at 1167 (stating that new copying technology is always disruptive to old established
markets, but the market will establish a new equilibrium).
91In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (various recording industry
plaintiffs claimed that Aimster was a secondary infringer of their copyrights for providing software
that allowed for the sharing of music files, even though the files were encrypted).
95 See id. at 653.
9 Id. at 651 (noting the disagreement about whether the capability of a single noninfringing
use provides complete immunity to contributory infringement).
97 See id. at 653 (stating the mere possibility that a file-sharing tool could be used in
noninfringing ways is not enough to escape liability where the product is used solely to facilitate
copyright infringement).
9

98 Id.

9 Id. at 652.
100 Id.
101Id. at 653. The willful blindness theory is dicta because Aimster was shown to actively
induce infringement. See id. at 652. Willful blindness establishes an economic test:
if the infringing uses are substantial . . . the provider of the service must show
that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least
reduce substantially the infringing uses ....
Aimster blinded itself in the hope
that by doing so it might come within the rule of the Sony decision.
Id. at 653.
102 Id. at 650. Judge Posner believes "willful blindness is knowledge." Id. For example,
One who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings,
takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the
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II.

EXPLANATION OF THE PROBLEM

Not only have two circuits applied the Sony test differently, but the decisions
have also combined elements of contributory and inducing infringement. This
10 4
disparity most likely led the Supreme Court to accept certiorari in Grokster.
Contributory and vicarious liability, standing alone, do not appear to be the solution
to the problem of widespread internet piracy. Furthermore, the Sony test, by itself,
was ill prepared to meet the challenges to copyright law that came with the
introduction of the internet. Congress has attempted to clear up this confusion by
codifying a test for inducing infringement. 10 5 Proposed in June 2004 by Senator Orin
Hatch, the Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, would create a new
"inducement" cause of action under federal copyright law. 10 6 As proposed, a
copyright owner could sue anyone who "intentionally aides, abets, induces or
procures" a third party to commit infringement. 10 7 In addition, the Induce Act
defines intent as wherever the circumstances would lead a "reasonable person" to
108
find intent.
The Induce Act came under immediate attack, however, by academics and the
technology community, arguing that a "reasonable person" standard is broad enough
to encompass any technology that is simply capable of permitting infringement. 109
This test may place new technologies in the control of the recording and motion
picture industries by forcing an innovator to implement certain design changes to
avoid liability.
Part III of this comment examines the Induce Act for its
appropriateness as an addition to copyright law.

nature and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal intent, because a
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish
a guilty state of mind.
I. (citation omitted).
103 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,125
S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (stating "there is no separate 'blind eye' theory or element of vicarious
liability").
101See Wu Blog, supra note 78. Wu discuses the court's decision in G-rokster in light of the
"willful blindness" standard:
On one account, Grokster escaped liability because it deliberately created a P2P
network over which it had no control over specific file transfers. If it is trivially
easy to create a network that makes it easy to stop copyright infringement, cannot
Grokster be accused of trying to make an "end run" around the law, or making
itself "willfully blind" to the infringement it is contributing to?

Id.
105 Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
106Id.

Id.
Id.
109 See Katie Dean, Induce Act Talks Sputter, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 7, 2004, para. 14, at
107
108

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter
Induce Talks] (suggesting that the entertainment industry was more interested in punishing
technology than behavior).
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III. ANALYSIS
Part A of the analysis presents the argument in support of the Induce Act by
analyzing Senator Orin Hatch's proposal before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. Part B explores the Supreme Court's policy reasoning for adopting the
article of commerce limitation to contributory infringement in Sony. Part C
compares the language of the Induce Act to "active inducement" in patent law.

A. SenatorHatch s Proposal
Senator Hatch disliked the Ninth Circuit's construction of Sony.110 Specifically,
he disagreed with the application of the Sony test in Grokster that allowed P2P
distributors to evade liability. 111 The Senator asserted that the court forgot that
secondary liability usually targets: "(1) those who induce others to break the law, and
(2) those who control others who break the law." 112 For example, inducement is
113
present in the Patent Act and criminal law.
Grokster and Morpheus, the Senator argued, were criminally inducing people to
infringe copyrights and were profiting from this illegal activity.11 4 In fact, the
Senator went as far as to say that no "civilized country" would allow a company to
profit by inducing children to break the law.11 5 Additionally, in support of his
proposal, Senator Hatch seemed particularly distressed by the idea that P2P is an
outlet for distributing pornography to children.11 6 Contrary to Senator Hatch's
rationale for the proposal, many individuals in the technology sector believe the
RIAA and Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") are the primary
1 17
supporters of this legislation.

110 See 150 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Senator Orin Hatch).
(pointing to the fact that Napster and Grokster have the same file sharing functionality but were
decided differently).
111

fTd.

1121d. at S7189.
113 See id. (stating that criminal law defines inducement as "that which leads or tempts to the
commission of crime").
II Id. at S7191.
The Senator proposed the Induce Act to allow creative artists to sue
corporations that profit by encouraging others to commit acts of copyright infringement. See id.
115

Id.

116

Id.

at S7190 (stating that most file sharing networks are filled with obscene, illegal child

pornography, which is harmful to minors). However, a search engine can be just as harmful to a
child inclined to view pornography. See Google, at http://www.google.com. Searching for the word
'porn" using Google's search engine produced 25 million results. Id. (search conducted April 6,
2005). Each page would be one click away for any child or adult to easily view, without the effort of
downloading a P2P program. See id.
11 But see Portnow, supra note 20. Portnow claims the supporters of the Induce Act include
"ASCAP, BMI and SESAC; the American Federation of Musicians and American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists; and the Recording Artists' Coalition, the Songwriters Guild, the
Nashville Songwriters Assn., the Music Managers' Forum and others all join the Recording
Academy." Td. The MPAA serves as the voice and advocate of the American motion picture, home
video and television industries. MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/home.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
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Nevertheless, the Senator maintained that secondary liability must remain
flexible through judge-made law because it is difficult to codify without being
reactionary to each new technology. 118 For example, in Sony the Supreme Court
attempted to strike a flexible balance between copyright owners and the distribution
of new copying technologies. 11 9 According to the Senator, this balance has been lost:
In cases like Napsterand Grokster, lower courts misapplied the substantial
noninfringing use limitation. These courts forgot about "balance" and held
that this limitation radically alters secondary liability. In effect, these
cases retained secondary liability's control prong but collapsed its
inducement prong. The results of these cases prove this point: Napster
imposed liability upon a distributor of copying devices who controlled
infringing users; Grokster did not impose liability upon distributors who
appeared to induce and profit from users' infringement. 120
Senator Hatch believed that a misunderstanding of Sony led to the irony of the court
system only punishing control, but his assessment of the function of the Sony test is
incorrect.
The Senator's attempt to rectify the confusion created by Napsterand Grokster
is broad, allowing a court to punish both control and a lack of control. 121 Applying
the Induce Act to the Apple iPod®, where the technology has a substantial
noninfringing use, the acts of the users of its technology could lead to inducement
liability.1 22 Apple becomes liable for simply distributing the technology, without
looking at its actions to encourage infringement.1 23 Senator Hatch wanted the
Induce Act to "preserve the Sony ruling" by "simply [importing] and [adapting] the
Patent Act's concept of 'active inducement' in order to cover cases of intentional
inducement that were explicitly not at issue in Sony."124 However, the iPod® example
shows that the Induce Act effectively abrogates the Sony test for contributory

118 150 CONG. REC., at S7190. Senetor Hatch stated that Congress re-codified the Copyright
Act in 1976 to avoid readjusting it with the advent of each new technology. Id.
11) Id. (stating that the Sony doctrine would not have been problematic if courts correctly
applied it); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). "The staple
article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand
for effective ... protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce." Id.
120

150 CONG. REC., at S7190.

121 See ProtectingInnovation and Art while PreventingPiracy:Hearing on S. 2560 Before the
S. Comm. On the Judiciarly,108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Andrew C. Greenberg, Vice Chairman,
Intellectual Property Committee, IEEE-USA), availableat http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/policy/2004
/072204.pdf [hereinafter Greenberg]. The Induce Act will allow the judiciary to punish what it
believes are bad technologies rather than punishing bad behavior. See id. at 15.
122 See Apple Complaint, supra note 5.
123 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 15. Greenberg points out that this result is opposite to
Congress' goal of promoting the progress of science and arts. See id. In effect, the Induce Act would
chill innovation at both the development and investment level. See id.
124 150 CONG. REC., at S7192. Clause (g)(3) of the Induce Act states that the act will not
"diminish the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability." Inducing Infringement of Copyright
Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
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liability. 125 The simple act of distributing a technology with noninfringing uses
should only be analyzed under a contribution standard.
In addition, the Induce Act can be viewed as the reactionary strike the Senator
distinctly argued against codifying. 126 First, the primary motivation for its proposal
is to combat a new type of program on the internet. Second, Congress had not seen
fit to legislatively reverse or clarify Sonyfor over 20 years and failed in an attempt to
codify a law declaring P2P technology illegal. 127 Third, any confusion will not be
cleared up with an untested standard. Finally, the Induce Act fails to target P2P
128
alone because of its breadth.

B. Sony Stands for Separation of Powers
The Sony opinion not only involved the law governing copyright, but also decided
a fundamental Constitutional question addressing separation of powers.1 29 In Sony,
the Supreme Court declared that Congress would be better at balancing copyright
law demands than the judiciary.1 30 Therefore, the Court stressed its historical
deference to Congress for guidance when technological advances present questions
pertaining to the Patent and Copyright Clause.1 31 Functionally, the Court did not
want the judicial system in charge of determining the liability of a technology that
had both infringing and noninfringing uses. 132 Congress is the branch of the federal
125 See Apple Complaint, supra note 5, at 1-9. Because this is a new cause of action, a court is
not likely to allow a technology distributor to evade liability using the Sonytest. See Universal City
Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
126 150 CONG. REC., 57190. Hatch says that Congress has attempted to avoid legislating every
new technology that alters the media landscape. Id. Examples include amendments to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. Id. at S7189.
127 See H.R. 5211, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (proposed "to limit the liability of copyright
owners for protecting their works on peer-to-peer networks").
128 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16. The Induce Act punishes bad technology instead of
bad actions. See id. at 15. Passage of the Induce Act could lead to liability for many of the
technologies that people use in their everyday lives. Id. at 16.
129 See Lawrence Lessig, Continuing CongressionalConfusion on Copyrights, Lessig Blog, July

7, 2004, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002015.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter
Lessig Blog] (arguing that the Supreme Court was balancing the interests of copyright owners and
technology creators and asserting its belief that Congress was the proper realm to debate a
technology that has a noninfringing use). This would not be the first Constitutional challenge to
Copyright laws. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (challenging the Sony Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act on the ground it violated the "for limited times" provision of the Patent and
Copyright clause).
130 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The Court
stated that:
it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the
public appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries . . . and society's competing interest
in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce . .. our patent and copyright
statutes have been amended repeatedly.
Id.
131 Id.
at 431.
132 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 9.
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government with the authority and ability to evaluate the competing interests that
will be affected by new technological innovations that alter the market for
copyrighted materials. 133 Furthermore, the Constitution places the power to promote
the progress of science and the arts within the realm of Congress. 134 Therefore, the
Sony test bars a court from analyzing the merits of a technology that is capable of a
135
noninfringing use.
A broad Induce Act, however, will force the judiciary to determine the
appropriateness of a technology; much like the Ninth Circuit chose to do in
Napste. 13 6 Sensing wrongdoing, the court chose to implement alternate theories of
liability by extending vicarious liability. 13 7 Traditionally, vicarious liability held "a
principal liable for the tortious conduct of agents acting within the scope of their
agency.'138 In contrast, after Napster,a technology creator may be liable for a failure
to prevent infringement, rather than actively encouraging it.139
This extension of liability for a failure to control is responsible for Senator
Hatch's realization of the current confusion in P2P secondary liability.1 40 A system
built on control is punishable while a system designed without control goes
unpunished.1 41 Adding a cause of action for inducement would be a more appropriate
standard.1 42 For example, advertising or distributing a technology that is simply
capable of infringement should be analyzed under a different standard than
advertising a cassette tape with the specific knowledge the tape is counterfeit. 143 The
Patent Act provides a test for inducement that may be appropriate.

133 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
134 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135

See Sony 464 U.S. at 442.

Greenberg, supranote 121, at 10-12.
See id. 9-10. The court in Napster followed its precedent set in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) to extend control principles. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001). In Fonovisa, the defendants, operators of a
flea market, allowed vendors to sell counterfeit music recordings in violation of plaintiffs copyrights
and trademarks. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
Fonovisa held that "even in the absence of an
employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." Id. at
262.
318Greenberg, supranote 121, at 6.
139 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024; 150 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement
of Senator Orin Hatch); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
HO 150 CONG. REC., S7190 (proposing that any secondary liability rule "punishes control and
immunizes inducement is a public policy disaster").
136

137

141

Id,

112 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (proposing a "willful
blindness" theory to remedy this paradox). However, the Ninth Circuit believed Judge Posner
misread Sony. SeeMGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004). (stating that there is no separate "blind eye" theory or
element of secondary liability).
143 See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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C. Comparingthe Language of the Induce Act to the PatentAct
By developing a theory that finds secondary liability for the failure to exercise
control, the Ninth Circuit has already crossed its judicial boundary to decide when a
technology creates more benefit than harm. There is support, however, for the
addition of "active inducement" to the Copyright Act. 144 The addition of active
inducement to the Copyright Act would compliment the doctrine of contributory
145
liability by punishing those who actively encourage copyright infringement.
Adopting this technology-neutral standard would also harmonize copyright and
patent law.
Part 1 of this section compares the level of intent required for active inducement
under the Patent Act with the level of intent required for the Induce Act. Part 2
compares the actions that give rise to liability under active inducement and the
Induce Act. Part 3 compares the application of the article of commerce doctrine
under active inducement and the Induce Act.

1. Intent and Knowledge in Active Inducement
For active inducement under the Patent Act, liability may be established where
the defendant takes active steps to induce infringement through "advertising,
instruction, or the like." 146 For example, the mere sale of an article of commerce with
147
the constructive knowledge of a buyer's intended use is not active inducement.
Consequently, there is no intent to induce infringement where a product has a
substantial noninfringing use, even when the defendant has constructive knowledge
that some users of its product may be infringing the patent. 148 Under an active
inducement test, Sony would have been decided in the same way, even though Sony
had constructive knowledge that their product might be used for copyright
infringement.1 49 In contrast, under a reasonable person standard of intent, the act of
distributing a product with the capability to facilitate infringement could subject the
distributor to liability.

144

See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16-17. (proposing that Congress finish what the Supreme

Court began in Sony and appropriate the active inducement from the Patent Act).
"1 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 12-14.
146 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04.3 (2004).
Simply advertising or
explaining how the technology operates would not be inducement. Id. § 17.04.4. Rather, to be liable
for inducement the infringer would have to teach the infringing use. Id.
147 Id. § 17.04.2.
148 Id. § 17.04.3, (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98-C-4293, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23784 (N.D. 11. Dec. 3, 2003)).
149 Soo Greenberg, supra note 121, at 15-16.
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2. Actions ConstitutingActive Inducement
Patent case law construes facilitation to require an affirmative action. 150 An
omission, or simply allowing users of a technology to infringe, is not an affirmative
act that will lead to a finding of inducement. 151 Applying this bad action requirement
to P2P cases, a programmer could legally code for an absence of control and
knowledge, creating a model that is superior to the Napster style of client/server
file-sharing technology. 152 In contrast, combining Napsteis control theory with the
Induce Act chills technology innovation. 153 Obviously, punishing control removes the
incentive to code for it.154
A solution adopting active inducement would allow an innovator to build control
into their technology, but would punish behavior that actively or directly encouraged
inducement. 155 Furthermore, this test removes the necessity for extending vicarious
liability that the Ninth Circuit performed in Napster,where the court felt there was
wrongdoing, but could not find liability with a direct application of Sony.1 56 In cases
applying active inducement under the Patent Act, the marketing and sale of a
product having a substantial noninfringing use, without more, can never be active
158
inducement. 157 This standard would allow Apple to sell the iPod® without fear.

3. Article of Commerce Limitation Applies to Active Inducement
When Congress added section 271(b) to the Patent Act, the active inducement
element did not include the article of commerce limitation.1 59 However, courts still
applied the substantial noninfringing use test. 160 This limitation prevents patent
owners from expanding their exclusive rights over an article of commerce. 161 That
would upset the delicate balance established by section 271(d), codified to balance
contributory infringement and patent misuse. 162 A finding of active inducement
would not stop an inducer's sale of the article of commerce, but instead would put an
injunction on the bad actions of the inducer.16 3 In contrast, the Induce Act would
150 Soo CHISUM, supra note 146, § 17.04.4. For example, "it is not enough to show that [a
party] failed to take steps to prevent its ... affiliates from servicing [infringing machines]." Id.
151 Id.
152 Se Greenberg, supra note 121, at 9-10; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1164 (9th Circ. 2004), cert.granted,125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004).
153 Greenberg, supra note 121, at 15.
154 Se Wu, When Code Isn'tLaw, supra note 72, at 682 (stating that a programmer will target
specific weaknesses in legal regimes where it is trivially easy to do so).
155 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16-17.
156 Id. at 9.

157

Id. at 16-17.

See Apple Complaint, supra note 5 (claiming Apple is subject to Induce Act liability for
simply distributing a device capable of facilitating infringement, the iPodR").
'59 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
1c,0See CHISUM, supra note 146, § 17.04.
161 Id.
1 2 Id. at § 17.02.
103 -d. at 17.04.3 (stating that because mere sale is not wrongful under Patent §§ 271(b) or (c), a
158

court would not put an injunction on the sale of an article of commerce, but rather extend an
injunction against conduct actively inducing infringement).
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abrogate the Sony test because the bad actions of the users of a technology lead to
164
liability, even where that technology has a substantial noninfringing use.

D. The Supreme Court's Review ofGrokster
The Supreme Court's decision in MGM v. Grokster will undoubtedly have an
165
effect on the law governing secondary liability in copyright infringement cases.
Especially if Congress chooses not to revisit the Induce Act.1 66 In order to protect
innovation, an appropriate standard would not subject a technology distributor to
contributory liability for simply distributing a technology capable of facilitating
infringement. Assuming the Court is against directly overruling the "Substantial
noninfringing use" limitation to the doctrine of contributory liability developed in
Sony v. Universal, the Court is likely to develop a test for inducing infringement.
However, this standard is not likely to resemble the Induce Act but rather active
inducement.
Creating an active inducement standard presents four benefits to creating a new
contributory liability standard by reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision. First, active
inducement provides a technology-neutral standard that would be applicable under
circumstances other than P2P technology. 167
Second, active inducement was
proposed in briefs amicus curiae by the United States and the IEEE-USA.168 The
United States Solicitor General's Office filed a brief in support of the petitioners and
the IEEE-USA filed in support of neither party. 169 Third, active inducement would
allow the court system to find Grokster and StreamCast liable for the infringement
their programs facilitate based on their actions to expand the service.170 Fourth,
164

See Lessig Blog, supra note 129.

165 Supreme Court Docket for 04-480, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/

04-480.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). Oral arguments were scheduled for Grokster on Tuesday,
March 29, 2005. Id.
166 But see Gigi Sohn, Getting Real About the Grokster Case, CNET NEWS, Feb. 8, 2005, at
http ://news.com.com/Getting+real+about+the+Grokster+case/2010- 1028_3-5566243.html
(last
visited Apr. 6, 2005) (stating his belief that regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Grokstnr,
the RIAA and MPAA will lobby Congress to codify a win or reverse a loss). Sohn is the President of
Public Knowledge, a Washington DC based advocacy group working to defend rights in the emerging
digital culture. Id.
167 See 150 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Senator Orin Hatch)
(expressing that Congress re-codified the Copyright Act in 1976 to avoid readjusting it with the
advent of each new technology); Greenberg, supra note 121, at 12-14. A flexible, content-neutral
standard, is important for not only promoting innovation but also because the content industry
should not be put in control of the development of new technologies. For example, Jack Valenti is
infamous for stating, "the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti President, Motion Picture Ass'n of
Am., Inc.), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
168 Brief Amicus Curiae of United States at 12-14, 33-35, Grokster (No. 04-480); Brief Amicus
Curiae of IEEE-USA in Support of Either Party passim, Grokster(No. 04-480).
169 See sources cited supra note 168.
170 See Reply Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 13-16,
Grokster (No. 04-480) (discussing the actions by Grokster and StreamCast Networks that actively
induced infringement of copyrighted works).
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adopting an active inducement standard avoids confusion and respects precedent by
leaving the 20-year old Sony test intact.

IV. PROPOSAL

The Ninth Circuit has essentially legalized the distribution and design of P2P
file-sharing technology. Whether legalization will spread among the court system
depends upon the Supreme Court's review of Grokster and Congress' passage of the
Induce Act. This comment focuses on the Induce Act, because there will be pressure
on Congress to clarify secondary liability, regardless of the Court's decision in
Grokster.171 Because of the broad intent standard of the Induce Act, the ultimate
17 2
question of a technology's appropriateness in commerce would fall to the judiciary.
However, the Constitution places the power to promote the progress of science and
17 3
the arts exclusively in the hands of Congress.
This comment proposes three courses of action. Part A proposes that Congress
should not pass the Induce Act as currently proposed. Part B recommends
alternative language in order to harmonize patent and copyright laws. Part C
explores a substitute to legislation that allows the free market to establish
equilibrium through alternative compensation methods for copyright holders.

A. The Induce Act Should Not Be Passed
Senator Hatch proposed the Induce Act to create a cause of action enabling
copyright holders to sue P2P distributors.1 74 However, this overbroad cause of action
will allow claims to be filed anytime a technology allows copyright infringement,
regardless of the intent of its creator or distributor to encourage infringement. As a
result, the determination of the legality of a technology capable of both infringing and
noninfringing uses will fall to the judiciary.1 7 5 This result violates the separation of
powers ideology established by the Constitution and asserted by the Supreme Court
in Sony.17 6 In fact, Congress embodied that ideology in the article of commerce
177
defense to contributory liability found in the Patent Act.

See Gigi Sohn, supra note 166.
Soo Greenberg, supra note 121, at 10-12. The legality of a new technology was an easy
question under Sony. Id. However, after Napster, even a subsequent upgrade to a service may
171
172

constitute control and lead to liability. See id. Under the Induce Act, a summary judgment in favor
of a new technology will be impossible because a court must make a policy inquiry in each case into
the reasonable person's state of mind in bringing a technology to the market. See id.at 15.
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
174 Soo Hatch, supra note 17.
175 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16. The Induce Act becomes a lawyer employment act
because summary judgment will not be possible where a technology has infringing use capabilities,
leaving liability as a policy question for the judiciary. Soo Lessig Blog, supra note 130.
176 Id. Lessig states:
[Sony] is an opinion about separation of powers - about which branch is best able
to do the necessary balancing that copyright law demands, "within the limits of
the constitutional grant." [W]hen a technology is not simply a technology for
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The article of commerce limitation coincides with public policy considerations
and the goal of intellectual property law to promote the progress of arts and
science. 178 In Grokster,the Ninth Circuit held that technological advancement could
balance favorably against some infringing activity. 179 The court reasoned that
1 80
sometimes it is necessary to allow infringement in order to encourage innovation.
Indeed, a contrary result would be antithetical to the intended purpose of the
Progress Clause.181 "Rather than smothering the new to benefit the old," the
Grokstercourt properly "[struck] a balance between the claims of new technology and
18 2
the legitimate rights of content creators."
The Induce Act, on the other hand, would disastrously allow intent to be inferred
whenever a reasonable person would find intent to induce. Applying this standard,
intent to induce can be found whenever an innovator distributes a new technology
that has the ability to infringe. This result does not accomplish the Act's narrow
18 3
purpose of fighting P2P, but envelops any technology that copies information.
Congress must not pass a law that has the ability to chill innovation across "virtually
every general-purpose computer and technology tool [with] features that manipulate,
control and display content."18 4 Overturning Sony, via Grokster, would have the
18 5
same result.

violating the law, then it is left to Congress to decide whether and how that
technology is to be regulated.

Id.
177 See id.
Lessig explained how innovation will be chilled if the Sony test is abrogated
because:
courts are awful, expensive, and slow institutions for judging the economic effect
of new technology ....
The Sony rule says: let the innovation go, if there is a
potential for a substantial noninfringing use, and if Congress wants to regulate it
more, then let Congress weigh the benefits of the technology against its costs.

Id.
178 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).

See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Circ. 2004), cert.
giranted,125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
180Id.
181 See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster."Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance
Onhne Music Distribution,8 B.U. J. Set. & TECH. L. 451, 498 (2002) (arguing that copyright law
chills innovation by "(i) giving content owners de facto control over new technologies of distribution,
(ii) failing to encourage the development of (fair) use technologies, and (iii) giving content owners
control over every step in the chain of distribution").
182LESSIG, supra note 23, at 194.
183 See e.g., Hatch's Hit List, at http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/#hit-list (last visited Apr. 6,
2005) (listing the products and services that could fall within the intent standard of the Induce Act,
including: iPodsR", TiVoR, Silly Putty, Legos, and the U.S. Postal Service).
184 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16.
185 See Induce Talks, supra note 109, para. 14 (stating that where a technology has dual uses
the courts should not determine whether it is legal).
179
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B. A Substitute to the Language of the Induce Act
In order to clarify copyright law, Congress should codify contributory
infringement and inducement into the Copyright Act. 186 However, as the previous
section proposed, the Induce Act is not the proper vehicle to accomplish this goal.
Rather, a more appropriate addition would function similar to active inducement.
Active inducement seeks to punish bad behavior that positively encourages
infringement, rather than labeling a technology as bad because it is simply capable of
facilitating infringement. 187 Active inducement is a technology-neutral standard that
would keep policy questions concerning the legality of a technology that has a
substantial noninfringing use, but allows its users the capability to infringe, out of
the court system. 188 The user infringes, not the technology.
After noticing widespread opposition to the Induce Act outside of Hollywood,
Senator Hatch invited interested parties to submit substitute language.1 89 Andrew
Greenberg, vice chairman of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers'
("IEEE-USA") intellectual property committee, put forward an excellent proposal. 190
This proposal borrows the narrow principle of active inducement to complement
contribution in circumstances where affirmative encouragement to infringe
accompanies the distribution of noninfringing and noncontributory technology. 191
Inducement under the Patent Act should be adapted to protect both the interest of
copyright holders and that of society to limit the scope of copyright laws to preclude
186 See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16-18 (proposing Congress continue where Sony left off
and appropriate the Patent Act's active inducement element in order to punish bad activity and not
bad technology).
187 See Induce Talks, supra note 109, para. 7 (suggesting that the entertainment industry was
more interested in punishing technology than behavior).
188 See Lawrence Lessig, Bytes and Bullets, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2004, A21 (illustrating
that there is no difference in principle between regulating P2P distributors and gun manufacturers
because both products cause harm). Similarly, the gun lobby would argue that a gun manufacturer
is not liable for its destructive uses. See id.
189 Induce Talks, supranote 109, para. 4.
190 Greenberg, supra note 121, at 20. The IEEE-USA suggested the following substitute to the
language of the Induce Act:
(g)(1) Inducement of Infringement. Whoever actively and knowingly induces
infringement of a copyrighted work by another with the specific and actual intent
to cause the infringing acts shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Contribution to an Infringement. Whoever knowingly and materially
contributes to the infringement of a copyrighted work by another shall be liable as
an infringer.
(4) Limitations on Secondary Liability.
(A) manufacture, distribution, marketing, operation, sale, servicing, or
other use of embodiments of an otherwise lawful technology by lawful
means, with or without the knowledge that an unaffiliated third party will
infringe, cannot constitute inducement of infringement under Subsection
g(1) in the absence of any additional active steps taken to encourage direct
infringement.
(B) manufacture, distribution, marketing, operation, sale, servicing or
other use of embodiments of an otherwise lawful technology capable of a
substantial noninfringing use cannot constitute contribution to an
infringement under Subsection (g)(2).
Id.
191 See id.
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an unhealthy and undue intervention in ongoing technologies. 192 Piracy is wrong,
but copyright laws should not give the RIAA effective control over what others have
created.
Our laws must encourage technology innovators to develop pioneering and
incremental improvements in technology. Innovation must not be chilled simply
because a noninfringing technology might have an infringing use. It would be fair,
however, to impose liability on innovators who, in the process of distributing their
technology, actively induce someone to infringe. This new "induce act" would only
punish bad behavior. It would punish independent acts of inducement beyond the
mere sale and announcement of features. The policy behind active inducement is far
193
healthier for innovation and is a familiar and proper question for the judiciary.

C. Alternative Compensation
In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit believed in letting the market adjust to P2P
technology on its own. 194 The Copyright Act extends to artists the exclusive right to
distribute their work.1 95 The policy rationale behind the Copyright Act is not to make
artists, composers or sculptors more money, but to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. The main incentive, however, for the major copyright holder's
struggle against P2P distributors is revenue.
In essence, they are fighting
disintermediation. Where the record labels would distribute compact discs to the
market before, P2P technology has encroached and arguably taken a bite out of
sales.1 96 Currently, artists and their record labels do not earn revenue when their
work is copied using a program like Grokster.
While it is the exclusive right of the composer to determine how his or her work
is distributed, the public has shown their overwhelming support for MP3 technology
and internet file sharing.1 97 Given the fact that file sharing in some form will always
192

See Greenberg, supra note 121, at 16-17.

193

See id. at 15.

See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004), ert.granted
125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). The court explained the policy rationale behind allowing the free market to
come to equilibrium, stating:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and
market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new
technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a
personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player.
Id.
195 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
196See RIAA, RIAA Issues 2004 Year-End Shipment Numbers, at http://www.riaa.com/news
/newsletter/032105.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) (stating CD sales increased in 2004 after declining
the four previous years).
197 See Katie Dean, Song-Swap Networks Still Humming, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 25, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65427,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) (stating that
researchers at the University of California at Riverside and the Cooperative Association for Internet
Data Analysis say P2P activity has not dropped off since the RIAA began suing individual P2P
users); see LESSIG, supranote 27 at 67 (citing a study showing 60 million Americans use or have
used P2P file-sharing programs).
194
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be around, the record labels should adjust to the market (as the "old" learned to do
with the introduction of cable and FM Radio) rather than suing their own customers
and scrambling for Congress to pass ill-advised additions to the copyright laws. 198 As
an alternative, the RIAA should focus its efforts not only on programs similar to
Apple's iTunes®, but also on working together with the P2P distributors. 199
For example, one promising solution proposes that each internet service provider
("ISP") ask their users if they want to pay an additional $1 per month for legal access
to as many MP3s as they desire from a particular music channel or genre. 200 Then,
ASCAP, BMI, or others could track downloads and distribute more revenue directly
to the artists based on their popularity. 20 1 Furthermore, ISP's would be quick to offer
such a service with their standard internet package in order to attract new
subscribers. 20 2 In addition, current subscribers would most likely agree to pay a
small monthly fee for the legal download of music. 20 3 A solution that directly gives
incentive to the creation of new works is not antithetical to the Patent and Copyright
Clause and supports a free market economy.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution values intellectual
property laws that reward innovation in science and arts. The most recent
innovation, P2P file sharing, is one of the most efficient technologies ever invented.
One of its greatest assets is that P2P file sharing facilitates the quick spread of
information. 20 4 However, the recording and motion picture industries do not
appreciate the significance of P2P file sharing and have attempted, through the court
system and Congress, to hold the distributors of this innovation liable for P2P's
capability to facilitate piracy.
Recently, Congress proposed the Induce Act, attempting to create a new cause of
action, available to any copyright holder, for the intentional inducement of copyright
198 Mark Cuban, When Will the Music Industry Do It Right?, Blog Maverick, Nov. 8, 2004, at
http://www.blogmaverick.com/entry/3856521420807387/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
199

See id.
see LESSIG, supra note 27, at 296-302. Lessig discusses alternative compensation,

200 Id.;

suggesting:
all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked with a digital
watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see,
there's no incentive to evade them).
Once this content is marked, then
entrepreneurs

would develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each

content were distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
Id. at 301.
201 See Cuban, supra note 198. For example, "200 million singles sold gets you $200 million in
gross revenue, one song at a time." -d. However, "five million people buying five channels at five
bucks per month gets you 300 million dollars in predictable annual gross revenues." Id.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,125

S. Ct. 686 (2004) (stating that P2P technology "significantly reduce[s] distribution costs of public
domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well as reducing the centralized control of that
distribution").
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infringement. However, the Induce Act's reasonable person standard of intent seeks
to punish bad technology instead of bad actions. This result violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by forcing the judiciary to make policy decisions on the merits of
a technology. Further, by abrogating the "substantial noninfringing use" test, the
Induce Act is antithetical to the public policy of the Patent and Copyright Clause by
chilling technological innovation. An innovator's entire company would be at risk
just for releasing a new technology. For these reasons, the Induce Act should not be
enacted or should be amended to incorporate active inducement from the Patent Act.
Furthermore, codifying both contribution and active inducement will clarify
copyright law and protect innovation. In the end, this codification supports the
balance of interests between innovators and the public that should be integrated into
intellectual property laws, and ultimately, is essential to the Constitution.

